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PANEL II
PRESIDENTIAL LAWMAKING POWERS:
VETOES, LINE ITEM VETOES, SIGNING
STATEMENTS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND
DELEGATIONS OF RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
DAVID SCHOENBROD*
My topic is the delegation of legislative power which occurs when a
statute authorizes the Executive to make the rules of conduct. My pur-
pose is to urge you to begin to rethink whether this prevalent practice is a
wise and good thing.
Compare Congress taking away some of the President's power with
Congress giving the President some of its own power. Presidents from
Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan and beyond have treated these two
situations quite differently. Presidents have been very happy to take
power from Congress; they have not been so happy to have Congress
tread on their own turf. When Presidents have objected to Congress
treading on their turf, they claimed to object on grounds of principle-
the principle of separation of powers. But as Judge Silberman pointed
out in the first panel, the ultimate purpose of separation of powers is not
to protect the President, but to protect the people. This purpose of pro-
tecting the people is also a good reason to stop Congress from giving its
power to the President. To the framers, Congress giving away its power,
as well as Congress taking the President's power, threatened the same
evil: too much power in too few hands. With delegation, that concentra-
tion of power has occurred on a massive scale.
The power to delegate is worrisome because, like the power to run
budget deficits, it allows legislators to use public power for their private
gain. With a budget deficit, legislators can claim credit for the benefits
from spending without having to take the blame for levying taxes to pay
the costs. The public, nonetheless, must still pay the costs, but through
taxes levied at some future time by, they hope, some other legislators.
With the delegation of legislative power, legislators can claim credit for
* Professor, New York Law School.
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the benefits which the regulatory statute supposedly will deliver without
having to take the blame for enacting the costly rules needed to achieve
those benefits. The public, nonetheless, must still feel these costs if the
statute's goals are to be achieved. They feel them, however, through
rules imposed by the agency.
The controversy in 1988 over a proposed 50 percent congressional pay
raise illustrates the lengths to which legislators go to shift blame. Con-
gress delegated the power to set its salaries to a commission subject to the
proviso that Congress could stop the pay raise by enacting another law.
The purpose of the delegation was to give members of Congress the pay
raise without exposing them to blame for supporting it. Indeed, the
House leadership planned to prevent a vote on a bill to repeal the pay
raise so that members could claim that they would have voted against it
if given a chance. When, however, public resentment began to build, the
House leadership conducted a secret ballot among members to determine
whether there should be a public vote. It is disturbing that legislators in
a democracy think they may properly keep such secrets from their con-
stituents. The House relented only when public opinion polls showed 88
percent of the citizenry opposed the raise. While in this case delegation
did not change the outcome, only rarely do major government decisions
get as much public attention and lead the public to come down so uni-
formly and so passionately on one side.
Congress' skewed exposure to the benefits and costs eventually felt by
the public biases it in favor of action-spending in the case of a budget
deficit and creating regulatory jurisdiction in the case of delegation. The
problem for the public goes well beyond Congress' failure to give ade-
quate weight to the direct costs-either of paying the debt or implement-
ing the regulations. Both budget deficits and delegation also create
indirect costs. In the case of budget deficits, these indirect costs, which
arise from the borrowing needed to finance the deficit, include interest
payments on the government debt, increases in interest rates, which all
borrowers face, and inflation. In the case of delegation, the indirect
costs, which arise from Congress creating expectations of regulatory ben-
efits without taking commensurate responsibility for regulatory costs, in-
clude raising and then dashing the public's hopes for regulatory
protection, subjecting industry to uncertainty as to its responsibility, and
requiring government, industry, and others to spend massive sums on
participation in the administrative rulemaking process. So even if crea-
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tion of regulatory jurisdiction does not lead to rules that achieve the reg-
ulatory goals, it imposes very real costs on the public.
These features of delegation help to insulate members of Congress
from electoral accountability and help to explain, according to political
scientists, why incumbent legislators get re-elected at much higher rates
than in the past. For example, approximately 98 percent of the members
of the House who ran got re-elected in 1986 and 1988. Those that lost
were generally tainted by scandal.
So why is it that Presidents from Ronald Reagan back to Franklin
Roosevelt fought encroachments on executive power, but not gifts of leg-
islative power? Why is it that in the agenda of our conference this week-
end there is much less talk about delegation of legislative power than
about other aspects of separation of powers? There are a number of pos-
sible explanations.
First, Congress pretends that it is acting in the public interest: "We
are giving away our power for the public good." But of course it is not
giving away its power because it has plenty of control over what the
agencies do. What it is giving away is accountability for its use of power.
Second, the Executive gets something from the delegation of legislative
power. The Executive gets the power to make the rules. But of course
the Executive takes the blame for the cost of the rules or, if the Executive
does not act as quickly as Congress wants, it gets scolded by Congress.
But very often that blame is felt by the next President. So the President
signs the bill and lets Congress scold the next President.
Third, there are some serious questions about whether the delegation
doctrine can work. One question is whether we have a judicially man-
ageable test of delegation. Another question is whether our government
could really function without delegation. Still another question is
whether we will get rules that are more or less in the public interest if we
eliminate delegation. During the later New Deal, all of these questions
seemed to get answered against the delegation doctrine. However, that
was at a time when we were traumatized by the Great Depression, and
many thought wholesale delegation was necessary for national survival.
Now, however, we see that much of the intellectual foundation that un-
derlay the New Deal's approach is just plain wrong. It rested upon theo-
ries about how delegation would work which have just not panned out.
For example, the New Deal assumed that delegation would mean that
experts, insulated from electoral politics, would make technical
decisions.
1990]
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Delegation in practice has meant that politicians enmeshed in electoral
politics make policy decisions. It is time for all of us to begin to take a
hard look at the delegation of legislative powers and surely not to urge
the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe to copy us in this regard.
FRANK EASTERBROOK*
I have been told we have ten minutes for these talks. In the Seventh
Circuit ten minutes is the amount of time we give appellants with hope-
less cases. I hope that this is not a reflection on what I am about to say.
I will try to persuade you that the allocation of time should have been
greater.'
This is a panel about Presidential lawmaking authority. I would like
to treat that subject to include sources and scope of Presidential power. I
want to discuss a question raised in the first panel: the extent to which
the President may act on the basis of constitutional views at variance
with the law that Congress has enacted.
An example. President Reagan refused to implement part of the Com-
petition in Contracting Act of 1984 that required some protests over con-
tracts to be referred to the Comptroller General. The Comptroller
General is not an executive official, and President Reagan thought the
reference would be a violation of the separation of powers. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit thought this presumptuous.2 Indeed, the
court thought it unconstitutional for the President to take the Constitu-
tion into account in making an enforcement decision, largely on the
ground that he had invaded the province of the courts and violated the
clause requiring the President to take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted. What could be less faithful, the court asked, than refusing to en-
force the law?
There turns out to be a long history of Presidents acting on the basis of
their constitutional conclusion at variance with statutes. Let me give you
two unproblematic examples: Congress passed the alien and sedition acts,
essentially making seditious libel criminal. People who were prosecuted
under these laws raised the defense that it was unconstitutional. The
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1. This talk is based on Presidential Review, an article forthcoming in Case Western Reserve
Law Review (1990).
2. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated in part, 893 F.2d 205
(1989) (en banc).
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defense was uniformly rejected. President Jefferson, when he came to
office, pardoned these people on the stated ground that the alien and sedi-
tion acts were unconstitutional. Second case: the Supreme Court held
that the Congress has the power to establish the Bank of the United
States, but the legislation authorizing it had expired. Congress author-
ized a new Bank of the United States. The President, Andrew Jackson,
promptly vetoed the bill on the ground that the legislation was unconsti-
tutional because the Supreme Court was wrong.3
These cases are generally deemed unproblematic. In both there was no
"take care" problem. Pardon power is an explicit power to do otherwise
than the law requires: there is no lack of faithful execution in vetoing the
bill. These are express powers. If the President has any power to con-
sider the prudence of a bill, he can also consider the Constitution.
Now consider some other nonproblematic or at least noncontroversial
cases. For example, the Supreme Court in the 1970s held unconstitu-
tional quite a number of provisions in the Social Security Act on the
ground of sexual discrimination. The Social Security Act was riddled
with sex-based distinctions. After each decision the executive branch
would go through the statute finding other provisions sufficiently like the
ones the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional and would decline to
enforce these on constitutional grounds. The Administrations of Presi-
dents Ford and Carter did this so frequently that Congress started enact-
ing appropriations riders requiring the Department of Justice to notify
Congress every time it refused on constitutional grounds to enforce a
statute.
Let me give you some illustrations that are controversial. In the Ford
Administration Congress enacted the Advisory Committee Act, requir-
ing open meetings of advisory committees. Is the ABA standing commit-
tee on the federal judiciary an advisory committee? President Ford
concluded that it is, and nonetheless refused to enforce it on constitu-
tional grounds. He believed that it interfered with his constitutional
powers of appointment. He reached this conclusion on the advice of At-
torney General Levi, whose advice was based on the advice of the Assis-
tant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel: one Antonin
Scalia. Second, President Wilson fired a postmaster who under the law
had tenure. President Taft, who had been transmuted into Chief Justice
3. COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 581-91
(Richardson ed. 1900).
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of the United States, upheld this decision.4
Then there is the granddaddy of defiance, Andrew Johnson, who sacks
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton despite the Tenure of Office Act, which
forbade him from replacing any cabinet member until another had al-
ready been confirmed. Stanton refused to leave office. Johnson was im-
peached, and only his acquittal by a very close vote in the Senate
persuaded Stanton to vamoose.' There are ongoing disputes about intel-
ligence activities and the War Powers Resolution as Secretary of Defense
Cheney reminded us earlier today.
Was President Johnson trapped by the Tenure of Office Act? Was
President Ford trapped by the Advisory Committee Act or President
Reagan by the Competition in Contracting Act? The argument that they
are takes three lines. One is that the take care clause of the Constitution
requires the President to implement the law, constitutional or not. Sec-
ond is that although judges have the necessary expertise to make consti-
tutional decisions, executive branch officials do not. Third is the
argument from chaos. If the executive branch could refuse to enforce
statutes on constitutional grounds, we would have chaos, which is
avoided by leaving these tasks to the judiciary.
I view the latter two of these three as make weights. Take expertise.
The President acts on the advice of the Attorney General, who acts on
the advice of the Solicitor General and the Assistant Attorney General
for the Office of Legal Counsel. Holders of these offices are not journey-
men. Let me give you some recent names: Rehnquist, Scalia, Bork, Mc-
Cree, Olson, and Starr. Earlier occupants include: Jackson, Taft,
Hughes, Cox, Griswold, my colleague Walter Cummings, and the man
who wrote the veto message for President Jackson in the Bank of the
United States case, a fellow by the name of Roger Brooke Taney, who
was promoted for good service.
As for chaos: there is only one President. Someone desiring chaos
could do no better than to delegate constitutional questions to six hun-
dred district judges, reviewed by 168 circuit judges sitting in panels of
three. If you wished to find a method to generate babble you would pick
that one. This, by the way, is a task in which we have acquitted ourselves
well. A unitary executive always does better in this respect than a hydra-
4. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
5. H. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW JOHNSON 276-78, 293-334 (1989).
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headed, uncoordinated judiciary. Indeed, consistency and accountability
were principal arguments for a unitary executive in 1787.
Now for the take care clause. There is a duty to enforce, not to negate.
The President must take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Is the
Constitution a law? If it is, then the President must execute it, too. In
any contest between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution
wins. So I invite you to step back and ask: Why does anyone have the
authority to review the statute for conformity with the Constitution?
Why is there judicial review? The argument given by Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison 6 was quite simple. It is that the Consti-
tution is law. We departed from the United Kingdom by having a writ-
ten and, therefore, an enforceable Constitution. It has a structure, it
limits each actor's powers, and it has a supremacy clause, which creates a
hierarchy with the Constitution on top. It requires all officers to take an
oath to the Constitution-to that hierarchy, in other words-so that in
the event of a conflict the Constitution wins.
These observations turn out to be an insufficient argument on behalf of
review. The tough question is not whether the Constitution is superior to
the law, but who shall decide. One could say that Congress by enacting
the statute has decided that the law satisfies all constitutional obligations.
If the Congress approves, who are the judges to doubt it? Chief Justice
Marshall's answer was essentially: In this governmental structure, every
man for himself. Every official owes a duty to the hierarchy and must
make an independent judgment and not knuckle under to the views of
others.
Translate this to the executive branch. The hierarchy is the same, the
duties of the Constitution are the same, and the role of each constitu-
tional official to make his own decision is the same. Therefore, the con-
clusion is the same.
How about an example? Congress is inflamed by the failure of the
drug war, and it passes the following law: "Section 1. The President
shall summarily execute Drug Czar Bennett and his claque and shall
confiscate their property, and none of their lineal descendants shall be
eligible for any public office. Section 2. No court shall have jurisdiction
to stay the enforcement of section 1." I take it that this is a bill of
attainder, with the corruption of blood feature that the framers found
particularly repugnant. Whether or not we would think section 2 effec-
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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tive, the President has a problem. Does he send the firing squad? I think
it is obvious that the President must not. He must refuse to execute Ben-
nett and need not wait for a district judge in Washington, D.C. to tell
him so. If you agree, we are done. We have established that the Presi-
dent may decide these questions for himself.
Let us suppose that you do not accept that. Let us suppose you think
it matters whether somebody gets judicial review. Let us suppose Czar
Bennett gets judicial review, but that a henchman, we will call him
Lovett, does not. Must the President execute Lovett? If the President
cannot set the constitutional rule above the law, why could he spare
Lovett even on the basis of a decision favoring Bennett? Why indeed, if
he cannot set the constitutional rule above the law, could he spare Ben-
nett? The Court interprets the Constitution. If the law trumps the Con-
stitution under the take care clause, then presumably it must trump the
judicial decree as well. Yet that is absurd because it implies that the
judiciary does not have a role.
If we grant judicial opinions any force beyond the parties, that must be
because the Constitution prevails over the law. The decision by the
judges shows the meaning of the Constitution, but it is the Constitution
that then prevails. A President may act on the basis of the Constitution
and not merely implement judicial opinions.
We are all temporary office holders. A particular group of office hold-
ers on First Street that interprets the Constitution is not fundamentally
different in that respect from the group on Pennsylvania Avenue or the
group at the corner of Ninth Street and Constitution. The source of all
contemporary authority is in documents each of us must implement, and
all of us owe our responsibilities to the entire constitutional structure.
STEVEN ROSS*
I was asked to come before what I was assured was a very receptive
audience, ready to listen to the views of one who spends his time repre-
senting the House of Representatives in litigation, often against the exec-
utive branch on questions of separation of powers. The topic was
described as that of Presidential lawmaking, although as you hear it de-
scribed and enunciated by the other panels, it can just as easily be de-
scribed as Presidential law breaking.
* Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives.
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I say that the notion that the President can simply decide to suspend a
law because, in his view, it does not work with his reading of the Consti-
tution, is one that goes to the very essence of our system of government
and the rule of law of this nation. It is one that was a typical dispute in
the history of England and led to the development of the English Bill of
Rights, which served as a predecessor for the take care clause. It was one
of the specific things won in the Glorious Revolution and agreed to by
King James.
That is not to say that the President does not have a very specific duty
to interpret the Constitution and to apply his reading of the Constitution
to the law of the United States. There are a number of matters in which
that is done and Judge Easterbrook gave perfect examples in describing
what he considered to be the two noncontroversial or nonproblematic
questions of Presidential constitutional interpretation. I would focus oft
the veto because that is one of the specific topics for this panel.
Clearly it is within the President's power, and it could be argued
within his obligation, to veto a bill that he believes to be unconstitutional.
The Constitution gives him that power as the primary mechanism of pro-
tecting not only the prerogative of the President, but also the American
people from potential encroachments of unconstitutional or unwise con-
gressional acts. Presidents have been diligent, and can be trusted to con-
tinue to preserve that power through a vigorous use of their veto power.
They should be encouraged to do so.
That is not to say that a President can, with the same sense of constitu-
tional authority, allow a statute to become a law, perhaps sign it into law,
and then simply ignore it, and make believe the law was never enacted.
There is a presumption of validity to enact the statute, and that presump-
tion should continue until such time as a court of competent jurisdiction
deems the statute to be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. It
is not a question of judges having a monopoly on wisdom about the Con-
stitution. I would like to think that those who populate the halls of Con-
gress as well as those in the executive branch are able to read the
Constitution, but clearly no branch is going to be 100 percent correct.
If there was complete wisdom of the Constitution, then we would
never have to fear an unconstitutional act. It would never get past the
halls of Congress; it would never be signed into law. Some system of
government, however, must prevail on how questions of constitutionality
will be addressed. The system in our government is that a law is brought
before a court, and the court in the performance of its functions deems it
1990]
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constitutional, and therefore should be followed, or unconstitutional, and
therefore null and void. It seems to me that the alternatives are a signifi-
cant risk to the very structure of our government.
Judge Easterbrook pointed out President Johnson's decision to ignore
the congressional statute and to go ahead and fire Secretary Stanton, a
decision that led to a constitutional confrontation and ultimately the trial
and impeachment of the President. Clearly that should not be the model
of appropriate behavior within the government.
I think the determination regarding the Competition in Contracting
Act is an excellent illustration of both the pitfalls of a Presidential sus-
pension of a statute and the practical benefits of judicial resolution,
which is the preferred alternative. When the Department of Justice ad-
vised the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to instruct
the offices of the government to ignore the provisions of the Competition
in Contracting Act, it created considerable concern in Congress. While
the case was proceeding before the judiciary in both the Ninth and Third
Circuits, the President's men were called before the appropriate commit-
tees in Congress to explain his position. In explaining the President's
position, both on the constitutionality of the statute and on the appropri-
ateness of the executive branch's behavior in ignoring or suspending the
statute, the Attorney General said that it was within the executive
branch's purview, not only to ignore the statute before any judicial reso-
lution, but to continue to ignore the statute upon resolution by the dis-
trict court. The Attorney General said that there was a question of the
district court's competence to decide a question of constitutionality. The
Attorney General further said that a court of appeals ruling would cer-
tainly be a matter the executive branch would take under advisement, but
that he would not consent to the notion that at that point, the executive
branch would be compelled to follow the law.
It is interesting that on the underlying question of constitutionality,
the President's lawyers were so sure of that, that they were willing to
instruct all offices of the government to ignore a newly enacted statute.
Yet the ultimate resolution of the question of constitutionality was de-
cided against the executive provision, and the constitutionality of the
Competition in Contracting Act was upheld in both circuits in which it
was contested.
I think recent history, as well as the history of England and the history
during the time of the framing of the Constitution, should give considera-
ble pause to those who would argue that the President's proper role in
[Vol. 68:533
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interpreting the Constitution extends to a construction that a statute
should be ignored. I also think the commonwealth can be better served
by the notion that the President has ample opportunity during the legis-
lative process to impress upon Congress his position and view of the Con-
stitution with regard to a statute. The President plays an extensive role,
particularly through the methodology of the veto, which Presidents have
used frequently to support their view of the Constitution. The Presi-
dent's authority should not extend to the presumptive power to suspend
a newly enacted statute.
It is interesting that while Judge Easterbrook was willing to advocate
that position from this podium, no judge in the United States, sitting in
his official capacity and speaking in a court, has endorsed the view es-
poused on behalf of the President. When the Department of Justice was
arguing its position in the Competition in Contracting Act cases, it was
unable to cite for support any decision or language of the official rules of
a United States court.
THEODORE OLSON*
Our time limitations remind me of the man driving down a country
road who pulled over when he saw a farmer holding a giant pig in his
arms. The farmer was lifting the pig so that it could eat acorns out of a
tree. The man ran over and told the farmer that it would be much better
if he would put the pig down, shake the tree, allow the acorns to fall, and
the pig could eat the acorns off the ground. "You'll save a lot of time
that way." The farmer replied, "What's time to a pig?"
I also feel like I should apologize for the Morrison v. Olson I case. I do
not know what else to say about it, but I am sorry.
Before I discuss Presidential lawmaking, I have a comment on the cre-
ation and history of the unitary Presidency discussed by the previous
panel. It is ironic that we should have to debate today whether we
should have a unitary executive, because of all the issues considered by
the Constitutional Convention, one of the most thoroughly debated and
clearly decided was the choice between a unitary and a plural executive.
Over Friday, Saturday, and Monday, June 1 through 4, 1787, our fram-
* Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel, 1981-1984.
7. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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ers conducted one of the most thoughtful and prescient debates of the
Convention in response to James Wilson's motion that the executive con-
sist of a single person. The pros and cons were considered at length and
a vote was taken. A decision was made on a seven to three vote to reject
a plural executive and enact a unitary Presidency.
Unfortunately, without a constitutional amendment or even a direct
Supreme Court decision, the vote of the delegates on June 4, 1787 has
been overridden and eroded so that we now have precisely the plural
executive rejected in Philadelphia. President Kennedy probably said it
best in response to a question about a government policy, "Well, I agree
with you, but I do not know whether the government will."
Today, just to highlight a few examples, the securities laws are not the
responsibility of the President; some of the criminal laws are not the
President's to enforce; antitrust laws are partially outside the President's
sphere; national economic policy is vested in the Federal Reserve Board,
which is not subordinate to the President; energy policy, communication
policy, and so on. The list goes on and on and on.
The President not only cannot control or coordinate the execution of
certain laws reposed in the hands of independent agencies, it is perceived
as an indelicate and somewhat improper act for the President even to
speak to the people who make those decisions. Every time the President
tries to communicate with someone at the Federal Trade Commission or
the Federal Communications Commission, there is an outcry about the
importance of the integrity and independence of these agencies. It is
news when the President's spokesman speaks (like he did the other day)
about something that is within the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve
Board. Judge Breyer made it a point to tell you he would not want these
decisions made in the White House. Would that be a terrible thing-if
the person elected by all the people of the United States was responsible
for enforcing the laws? But the President is the person the framers of
the Constitution designated to enforce the laws, not a group of relatively
anonymous, "independent" commissioners accountable to no one, except
perhaps a few congressional committees.
One of the problems with our current system is precisely that it takes
these subjects outside of the political debate. If we do not like the way
the SEC enforces the securities laws, what are we going to do about it?
We may hope that we can convince our congressional representatives to
change the law, but these issues do not come up in Presidential debates,
and Presidential candidates do not address them in their platforms.
[Vol. 68:533
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These subjects are becoming politically untouchable because the Presi-
dent cannot do anything about them.
I should probably now spend a little time talking about the subject
assigned: Presidential lawmaking. First, it seems appropriate to provide
a definition. While it seems elementary, it is difficult to describe where
lawmaking ends and where law execution begins. The Supreme Court in
the Chadha8 case defined "lawmaking" by describing the activity that
Congress could not perform except in the manner prescribed in the pre-
sentment clauses of the Constitution. But, curiously, in defining "law-
making" in that context, the Court implicitly upheld Congress' authority
to delegate that power to the executive branch.
The Court sustained Congress' delegation to the Attorney General of
the power to suspend a deportation, but the Court held that such an
action was lawmaking and that the Congress could not overturn the At-
torney General's decision with a one-House veto. In reaching this deci-
sion, the Court defined legislation as action that had the purpose and
effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of a person. Be-
cause such action constituted legislation, Congress could not do it except
in the constitutionally prescribed manner. Yet by overturning the one-
House veto, the Court upheld the power of Congress to delegate that
lawmaking act to the executive branch.
The following is a list of some of the ways in which the President par-
ticipates in the lawmaking process:
(1) The President through his subordinate, the Vice-President, pre-
sides over the Senate and may cast the tie-breaking vote directly in the
legislative process.
(2) The President has veto power. There are two types of vetoes:
return vetoes and pocket vetoes. Most of the time, the President exer-
cises a return veto because Congress is in session, and the Constitution
requires the President to return a bill with his objections to the House in
which it originated, so that Congress can decide immediately whether to
override the President's veto. Only a small fraction of Presidential vetoes
are overridden. When Congress has adjourned, the President need not
send the bill back because Congress is presumptively not there to receive
the returned bill. So the President simply does not do anything at all; he
vetoes the bill by sticking it in his "pocket."
The pocket veto is seldom discussed, although it was the subject of
8. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983).
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litigation several years ago. But the pocket veto is becoming increasingly
important because, although the Constitution denied the President an ab-
solute veto, which would kill a bill outright, in favor of the return veto,
which can be overridden, the pocket veto is more like an absolute veto
because it cannot be overridden. Congress has to re-pass the bill and,
after passing it again, the President can veto it a second time. This is
significant because Congress has increasingly postponed its major legisla-
tive activity until the final days or even hours of a congressional session.
Often it is three o'clock in the morning of the last day of the session, and
many subjects are rolled up in one bill so the President may find the bill
difficult to veto. But if he can do so politically, the pocket veto is a pow-
erful weapon.
When I was in the Justice Department I did a calculation regarding
the 94th, 95th, 96th and 97th Congresses. Somewhere between 25 per-
cent and 33 1/3 percent of the bills passed were passed within the last ten
days of a congressional session. Thus, the more powerful pocket veto is
available in a substantial number of instances.
(3) The third way in which the President may participate in the legis-
lative process is through the pardon power. A pardon, in a sense, alters
the legal rights of persons. It may be used to pardon a particular person,
or it may be used generally, as it was after the Civil War or the Vietnam
conflict.
(4) Next is the power to make treaties subject to congressional con-
currence. Under the Constitution, treaties become the law of the land.
(5) The executive agreement is widely perceived as a way in which
the President may get around congressional participation in the treaty
power. Regardless of how one might view the appropriateness or legality
of executive agreements, many Presidents throughout history have exer-
cised the power to act in this manner. The Louisiana Purchase was ini-
tially an executive agreement. The territory was bought and paid for
before congressional participation was even sought. President
Roosevelt's agreement to lend fifty destroyers to Great Britain in ex-
change for the right to lease air and naval bases, an action that arguably
violated two statutes, was accomplished through an executive agreement.
The annexation of Texas and later Hawaii came about the same way.
(6) The Constitution gives the President the express power to recom-
mend legislation. Depending upon the popularity of the President, that
may be a significant means of participating in the legislative process.
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(7) The President has the power to convene a Congress. In a sense,
this is a way to participate in lawmaking.
(8) The President participates in lawmaking on a continuous basis
through his power to enforce the laws. However you define lawmaking,
taking care that the law is faithfully executed involves the President in
making decisions about how the laws should be enforced. Some laws
may involve particularly broad delegations of discretion by Congress.
The antitrust laws are a prime example. Vast amounts of discretion to
make policy may be exercised by establishing enforcement priorities and
direction.
(9) The executive branch influences lawmaking through its power to
decide what cases to present and what arguments to make to the courts.
The President also has the power not to enforce or defend a statute in the
courts, a decision that can practically nullify a law. A less dramatic exer-
cise of this same authority is the power to select the cases and issues to
present to the courts and what cases to appeal. In this manner, the exec-
utive branch exercises significant control over lawmaking by the
judiciary.
(10) Through the process of signing statements, the President ex-
plains how he perceives and will interpret a statute. His statement be-
comes a part of the legislative history and may influence how the law is
interpreted by the courts.
(11) Executive orders constitute an effective lawmaking instrument.
President Truman integrated the Armed Forces with Executive Order
No. 9981. Executive Order No. 12,291 was a Reagan Administration
Executive Order that reformed the regulatory process in the executive
branch.
(12) Regulations enacted by the executive branch pursuant to statute
or simply by unilateral executive action constitute the largest body of
laws promulgated by the executive branch. The Supreme Court has held
that an executive branch regulation is enforceable even against the Presi-
dent. He has the power to reverse, withdraw, or rewrite the regulation,
but it remains enforceable and binding until revised. "So long as [the]
regulation remains in force, the Executive Branch is bound by it, and
indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the three branches
is bound to respect and enforce it."9
(13) Next are the President's emergency powers- sometimes de-
9. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974).
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scribed as Presidential prerogatives; sometimes criticized as Presidential
law breaking. Locke described the Executive's emergency powers as in-
cluding the authority to take steps that may not be authorized by law and
may in fact be contrary to law. President Jefferson explicitly defended
this power. Federalists No. 28 and No. 41 make allusions to these Presi-
dential powers.
An example occurred when Fort Sumtner fell while Congress was not
in session. President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports,
mobilized the state militia, increased the size of the army and navy, and
appropriated funds for war materials. These acts were not only not law-
fully authorized, but some of them were squarely inconsistent with the
Constitution. The Emancipation Proclamation is another example of a
Presidential emergency decree without statutory authority.
(14) The power to recognize foreign governments is not given explic-
itly to the President by the Constitution, but was established by President
Washington when he recognized Citizen Genet as the Ambassador from
the new French Republic. President Washington's example has been fol-
lowed by Presidents since then. This authority may have a major impact
on foreign relations and the operation and applicability of various laws
and treaties.
(15) The final area of Presidential lawmaking authority that I will
mention is another controversial one. Does the President have, and
under what circumstances may he exercise, the impoundment power?
Can he decide not to spend money that has been appropriated by Con-
gress? Can he defer or rescind appropriations?
These are some of the means by which the President participates in the
lawmaking process-some are explicitly authorized by the Constitution;
some are implied or have been developed through practice over the last
two centuries. Taken together, they permit the President a powerful in-
fluence in the legislative process.
DISCUSSION
SCHOENBROD: Ted Olson reminds us that the Executive's involve-
ment in lawmaking under the Constitution-the veto power, the Vice-
President's vote in the Senate, the power to recommend legislation and so
on-is not a delegation of Congress' article I power. We need to distin-
guish between the inherent article II power of the Executive and the arti-
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cle I power of Congress. If the President only exercises article II powers,
then there is not any problem of delegation of legislative power. When
the President is involved in rule enforcement-I think rule enforcement,
like Judge Easterbrook does, includes the power to interpret the laws,
including the Constitution-there is no delegation of legislative power.
It is a tricky business to distinguish between rule interpretation and
rulemaking, but the distinction has substance and is consistent with the
purposes of the delegation doctrine.
EASTERBROOK: Some of you may be wondering when we would get
to the topic of this panel. The topic is "Presidential Lawmaking Powers:
Vetoes, Line Item Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive Orders and
Delegations of Rulemaking Authority." Now we got off to a good start
from the first talk, but I am afraid I may have diverted things. My time
is quite brief, so my views will be compressed: yes, no, yes, yes, and
dubious.
ROSS: Let me take just a minute to comment on one of the issues that
Ted brought up. Let me preface my remarks by saying that I attempted
during my ten minutes to present a list of the President's ample power in
the legislative process. I am glad I left the task of filling out the list to
Ted, to whom it came more naturally; he did it beyond my wildest
expectations.
One thing that Ted talked about was pocket vetoes, a very timely ques-
tion. The description of the constitutional provision that the President
has the ability to pocket veto legislation when Congress is adjourned is
interesting, and it is not exactly correct. The difference between Ted's
description of the constitutional provision and my description is that
when Congress provides a remedy that prevents its return, the President
is able to pocket veto.
The basis of a coming clash between the Congress and the President
about the President's authority to pocket veto a bill is one that is being
played out, or will be played out, in the very first stage of the second
session of this Congress. The specific controversy revolves around a stat-
ute relating to the fates of Chinese students who were in the United
States during the Bejing uprising. The question is whether Congress, by
authorizing a functionary receipt from the President of a veto message,
has obligated the President to exercise veto authority by making a return
veto, thus returning the constitutional balance by allowing Congress to
override a veto; or whether because Congress is not meeting on the tenth
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day of presentation of the bill, the President can obtain a unilateral and
absolute negative on the bill. And I think the difference between those
two reasons are that those few words will be played out on the front
pages of the Chinese student's bill and also most likely in litigation over
the next couple of years.
OLSON: There has been litigation over pocket vetoes. The Supreme
Court decided the pocket veto case.1 ° Then there was litigation during
the Ford Administration after the pocket veto case. If another test is
coming along, it would be interesting to see what the Supreme Court will
do.
I agree very much that excessive delegation by Congress is deplorable
and is not good for the executive branch or for Congress. It undermines
accountability for the laws enacted and results in vague laws and capri-
cious regulations. It allows Congress to evade responsibility for the costs
of the laws it enacts. As Justice Scalia explained before he was appointed
to the Supreme Court, excessive delegation allows members of Congress
to vote in favor of laws that, for example, ban "unsafe products." That is
a safe thing on which to vote. But, then the executive branch must enact
volumes of regulations to explain what actually is prohibited, and no one
has really debated the costs, and on whom the burdens are going to fall.
Excessive delegation tends to deny due process, because Congress has
failed to consider the scope or effect of the legislation that it passes.
Nonenforcement of a statute by the Executive presents an intriguing
political and constitutional question, but it happens very seldom. The
fact that the President may have signed a bill, partially for the reasons
that Attorney General Thornburgh mentioned earlier today, does not
make a bill constitutional. That argument was raised in the Chadha case,
and the Court held that the fact that the law in question may have been
passed by Congress and signed by the President does not make it consti-
tutional. 11 Certainly legislation has the presumption of validity, but that
is all it has. The President does have some responsibility to consider the
constitutionality of the statute as he considers its enforcement. The Pres-
ident is given a special oath by the Constitution to preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution. That requires some judgment with respect to
the enforceability of a statute which he perceives to be unconstitutional.
10. The Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis, Nespelem, Colville, and Lake Indian Tribes or Bands
of Washington v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
11. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983).
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
WALTER BERNS:* Mr. Ross began his analysis on the take care clause
by referring to British practice, and that is appropriate on some occa-
sions. For example, I recall the first time the Supreme Court faced the
necessity of interpreting the ex post facto clause in Calder v. Bull.12 The
Court went to Blackstone and found an explanation of that language. I
do not think it is appropriate in this particular case when we are talking
about the powers of Congress and the President because the principle in
Britain is legislative supremacy, whereas the principle in the United
States is constitutional supremacy. Now it seems to me, you then recog-
nized that principle and went on to suggest, as I understood you, that
your constitutional questions are findings cited by the Supreme Court of
the United States or by the judiciary. The question then arises whether
the President is always required to obey a court order. Now there is one
famous occasion involving a not insignificant President of the United
States, namely, Abraham Lincoln, who, faced with a court order handed
down by the Chief Justice of the United States, Roger Brooke Taney,
refused to obey it. My question to you is: Is the President entitled to do
this sort of thing and, to preempt part of the answer or what I hope will
be your answer, are there not occasions when it is altogether improper
for the Court to have the final word?
The final constitutional court in some matters-matters involving dis-
putes between the President and Congress-is the people of the United
States. It seems to me that the Constitution itself recognizes this in its
impeachment clause. The Senate is not acting as a legislative body when
it tries an impeachment of the President. It is acting as a court: the
Chief Justice presides; it is a court acting in the name of the people and
charged with the responsibility of deciding a constitutional dispute be-
tween the Congress and the President. The President is required to obey
whatever the court orders. Does this not imply that he is not always
required to obey a Supreme Court order?
ROSS: Let me answer your question in two separate parts. First,
about my reliance on the British example, I am not sure I would agree
with the description of the status of the British governmental system in
1688 as being one of legislative supremacy. At that time, prior to the
* Professor, Georgetown University.
12. 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 385 (1798).
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Glorious Revolution, it was the King's power to suspend laws that I was
relying on, as have the courts citing British history.
BERNS: The British practice that was known in 1787 and 1789 was
certainly post-Glorious Revolution practice.
ROSS: I was talking about the 1688 example.
BERNS: Post-1688.
ROSS: Perhaps we are just speaking against each other. Let me turn
to the question of the President's obligation to follow a final dispositive
resolution by the Supreme Court of a question on the Constitution. I can
perhaps best answer that question by telling you what I have advised
members of the House of Representatives about a ruling of the Court
relating to the House of Representatives. I have taken the position, and
members of the House have agreed with the position, that the House
should comply with dispositive rulings, that is, final resolutions of ques-
tions by the Supreme Court. Is there the practical potential that any
other governmental body, be it the President or a House of Congress,
would refuse to abide by a final decision? Clearly there is. I hope that
we do not see that day. Those of us who practice law, particularly gov-
ernmental law do owe some obligation to the notion of the rule of law. I
think the part of the system that was crafted by the constitutional fram-
ers is one in which there will be an ultimate resolution of the question by
the Court.
Now it is true that the people of the United States are the final arbiter.
Displeased with a ruling by the Supreme Court, the President or Con-
gress has at its disposal several media of going to the people and chang-
ing the law of the land: be it through a constitutional amendment,
through a bill that changes the composition of the Court, or through
persevering and placing people on the Court who will agree with the
vision shared by the majority of the people if it differs with the Court. I
hope the day does not come when either the President on one hand, or
the Congress on the other, decides that it is within its constitutional pre-
rogative to simply ignore a final resolution of a constitutional question by
the Court.
QUESTION. Judge Easterbrook suggests 'yes" to signing statements.
The question that remains, however, is what happens when the President
says in his signing statement: "I am signing this law. However, certain
clauses of the law, which I believe raise serious constitutional problems, are
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unconstitutional " To what extent does that justify the President's deci-
sion not to enforce or execute the law; what role should that action play in
the Court's review of the law; and how should that be viewed as an integral
part of legislative history?
EASTERBROOK: Let me expand my "yes" a little bit. When the
President says in a signing statement that he views the law as dubious or
unconstitutional, that statement is not itself authority for later action.
That would be bootstrapping. Signing statements are more useful in
demonstrating understandings of the law's meaning and scope. The deci-
sion not to veto a law is part of the legislative process. The President's
signing statements are entitled to the same kind of weight as, say, a state-
ment in the Senate by the responsible committee that it is sending for-
ward a piece of legislation because it believes it carries the following
meaning. As a rule, statements of all sorts are not entitled to much
weight. They tend to be ex post, they tend to be written by staffers, and
so on.
All of the difficulties of legislative history also apply to the President's
signing statements. We do not suppose that it is really the President of
the United States expressing his own views. It was not so even in the
time of President Jackson, who sent off Roger Taney's non-signing state-
ment in the Bank of the United States bill. But Presidential views about
meaning are entitled to the same weight as contemporaneous legislative
history. The President is one of the three institutions whose approval
must be obtained, so what he understands those words to mean matters.
OLSON: I would add that in Chadha the Supreme Court said in foot-
note 13 that the fact that the President had signed numerous bills con-
taining legislative vetoes did not make them constitutional. 13 The Court
noted that eleven Presidents from President Wilson through President
Reagan, had gone on the record at some point challenging congressional
vetoes as unconstitutional.' 4 The Court collected in that footnote signing
statements expressing such objections, and the Supreme Court obviously
accorded some significance to those expressions.
QUESTION. Mr. Olson briefly mentioned the subject of impoundment. I
would like to ask ifMr. Ross would state the case against such a Presiden-
13. 462 U.S. at 942, n.13.
14. Id.
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tial power being constitutional and then ask if someone else on the panel
might tell him if he is wrong?
ROSS: I guess I can do that. I simply state that the Constitution
lodges the power of the purse in the Congress. Representatives elected
by the people are required to determine how the funds collected by the
revenues shall be spent. In working out ways to do so with the Execu-
tive, Congress has elected to provide the Executive with only limited flex-
ibility. Absent such a congressional grant, the President does not have
the authority to change the appropriations of the Congress. That was one
of the very basic powers that I think the framers determined to give Con-
gress in article I.
OLSON: I would like to hear what Judge Easterbrook has to say about
it. When I was in the Office of Legal Counsel we considered these ques-
tions and found the language of the legislation varied a great deal. Some
legislation was very explicit, indicating that mandatory expenditures
were required. In some instances, Congress had explicitly given flexibil-
ity to the Executive. In some laws, it was not clear at all. Congress
apparently had not given any thought to the subject, and it seemed to us
that the answer to the question might well depend upon the language
used in the particular case. If Congress makes it clear that it is insisting
that money has to be spent a certain way, I think Congress does have the
power to do so.
ROSS: Let me just pick up on that. I think it is clear to anyone that
there are many instances in which the language emanating from the Con-
gress has been less than crystal in its direction to the executive branch.
The remedy is better drafting by the Congress, not the development of a
new constitutional authority by the executive branch.
EASTERBROOK: I could give you another small piece of history-
call it executive history. During the Nixon Administration a broad claim
of the power to impound was made. It was uniformly rejected by the
lower federal courts. The government filed a certiorari petition in a case
involving some environmental matters, Train v. City of New York.15 The
Solicitor General at the time was Robert Bork. Solicitor General Bork
took a close look at the arguments pro and con on impounding, and he
withdrew the government's claim that there was an inherent executive
authority to impound. He made in that case exactly the argument that
15. 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
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Ted Olson just suggested-the particular statute as written did not re-
quire the expenditure of money, conceding that other statutes might be
written otherwise without being unconstitutional. The Supreme Court,
by a 9-0 vote, rejected the argument even with respect to that particular
statute. 6 It has always seemed to me that the conclusion Solicitor Gen-
eral Bork reached about the broader question is exactly right.
QUESTION. Panelists, assuming the Union had stayed together, and you
were in the position of President Lincoln, would you feel compelled to en-
force the Fugitive Slave Act upheld in the Dred Scott case17 despite your
belief that it was unconstitutional?
EASTERBROOK: The fugitive slave clause is not simply a statute, it
is part of the Constitution." The Constitution requires states to deliver
up fugitives. In declining to demand or enforce the delivery of the fugi-
tives, Lincoln would have been acting inconsistently with the Constitu-
tion. Scott was not found in a free state. His claim was that he had
resided in a free state and although he had returned to a slave state, his
journey had liberated him. What the Supreme Court held, in one of the
most bizarre opinions of all time, is that the whole idea of liberating
slaves is unconstitutional, that black people could not be citizens of the
United States. That conclusion made the Missouri Compromise uncon-
stitutional. The opinion gratuitously declared the Missouri Compromise
unconstitutional even though it had been repealed, making almost all
political compromise about slavery impossible from that day forward.
QUESTION Some insist the line item veto already exists in the Constitu-
tion. If the President were to accept that point of view, Judge Easterbrook
how do you think the President should approach that issue based on what
you have said about how a President should reconcile his view of the Con-
stitution and the take care clause?
EASTERBROOK: I am not sure that it poses to the President the
question that I was presenting. I was supposing that the law had been
enacted by valid processes, either with the President's signature or over
his veto. Then he must decide between the law and his understanding of
the Constitution. If the President decides that he possesses the line item
veto, we see a very different sequence. He then would send a veto
16. Id. at 44-45.
17. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (18 How.) 393 (1856).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cI. 3.
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message and make a return veto to the Congress saying he is vetoing
section 2(a)(3)(i). He would not carry out what he thought he had ve-
toed, but not because anything is unconstitutional.
You can then imagine the conflict at the next stage. The President
vetoes subsection 2(a)(3)(i). Congress sends back a letter drafted by Mr.
Ross saying: "Dear Mr. President, some crank has obtained copies of
your stationary and sent letters in your name. You have signed this law,
and it is now to be enforced. It is not our obligation to do anything."
The veto will be followed by private litigation. Whoever was a benefici-
ary of section 2(a)(3)(i) will sue.
QUESTION. Judge Easterbrook, just a quick follow-up. Would that
mean, therefore, that the President would sit in judgment of his own deter-
mination to not enforce a provision that he had implicitly vetoed?
EASTERBROOK: If he thought section 2(a)(3)(i) was not law, he
would not enforce it. That is how the pocket veto cases come up. The
Congress says, in the legislation that Mr. Ross referred to, "We have
named an agent who will always be here to accept a return." The Consti-
tution says that the President must make a return veto "unless the Con-
gress by its adjournment prevents its return."' 9 So the Congress now
believes that there is always someone there, so return is always possible.
The President believes, however, that the Constitution asks whether the
members of Congress are there, rather than whether an agent is present.
So the President makes a pocket veto and takes the position that this bill
did not become a statute. He will not enforce it. I think it is wholly
appropriate for him to take the view that a particular document is not a
duly enacted law. Litigation may ensue or it may not. But whether
something is a duly enacted law is something the President must decide.
SCHOENBROD: I have a question for Mr. Ross. The argument in
favor of the line item veto is that what Congress really has done is put
many bills into one bill so that the President is vetoing one bill out of
many. But I do not know how the President decides what constitutes a
bill. It would be ludicrous if he could line item veto the word "not."
But, if the President sent you an alleged line item veto letter, would you
say he vetoed the whole statute or vetoed nothing?
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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ROSS: I guess it would depend in part on the alleged line item veto
letter. It would depend on his choice of words. At times it can be a
difficult job to determine exactly what has happened. To go back to the
example of the Chinese student bill in which the President said in a
message delivered to the House: "Because I cannot deliver this message
to you, I therefore have pocket vetoed the bill. But, because I know that
there is some confusion about this matter, I am returning the bill with
my veto." Congress is scheduled to take up the question of whether or
not to override this veto, and the White House is, according to the press,
working late at night trying to save this veto which may or may not have
occurred.
My guess is that if the President were to be persuaded by what I am
convinced is a very small minority, even among pro-executive legal
scholars within the executive branch, that the authority for the line item
veto somehow exists, he would seek to utilize it. We would have as diffi-
cult a time winding our way through whatever message was sent. I
would hesitate to answer yes as to whether the House would try to over-
ride such a veto. I think it is more likely that when the veto came up
people would say, "Sorry, but that is not vetoed."
SCHOENBROD: So therefore the bill, the whole bill, would be
passed?
ROSS: That is more likely. Although, again, that is only one way to
view the veto letter. But, I think that is probably the most likely way.
QUESTION. Judge Easterbrook you perhaps prudently abstained from
answering Walter Bern's question about the authority of the President to
decline court judgments, and then managed to duck it in the Dred Scott
hypothetical I would like to hold your feet to the fire once again. Does
your view that the Executive, in interpreting the Constitution indepen-
dently, has the inherent authority to not enforce statutes also imply that
the President has authority to not enforce court judgments that he believes
are unconstitutional or rendered in excess of the Court's jurisdiction?
EASTERBROOK: Do I look like a traitor to my caste? Perhaps I
have a suspicious air about me. First, I think it is important to under-
stand that Presidents routinely ignore judicial opinions. The doctrine is
known as the limitation on offensive non-mutual issue preclusion. There
was a controversy about whether, when one court of appeals decides a
case, the government must apply the decision nationwide to other liti-
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gants. The Supreme Court of the United States held unanimously in
United States v. Mendoza2' that decisions of district courts, and indeed
courts of appeals, are not nationally binding. They are binding between
the litigants but are not the same as statutes. That distinction is
important.
The question then is whether the same limitation applies in cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court. That is something on which a series of
Presidents have spoken, but very few have acted. Thomas Jefferson was
of the view that the power of constitutional review is exercised indepen-
dently by each branch. He never really acted on his view. I believe,
however, that he is correct in principle. The three branches need not
agree. Congress may enact a law believing that a majority of the Court
will hold it unconstitutional. This happened quite a lot during Franklin
Roosevelt's first term. Members of Congress do not exceed constitu-
tional limits when they act on the basis of views at variance with the
Court's.
There is, finally, the question whether a President may disobey an or-
der in the litigant's own case. In principle he must obey; this is what the
"judicial Power of the United States" confides to courts. But is principle
always to prevail? Suppose the Supreme Court of the United States does
something absolutely wacky, and as President Lincoln did, the Chief Ex-
ecutive perceives the security of the Union at stake. It is his constitu-
tional duty to save the Union. You will not catch me damning Abraham
Lincoln. Saying that disobedience may be wise in extremis is, of course,
extraordinarily different from saying that it ought to be done.
Like the United Kingdom, which has managed to get on without a
constitution, the constitutional structure of this government has been
worked out in practice. Judicial review was inferred from structure. If
you look for the "judicial review clause" you find it is not there. It is
inferred from structure. Many later commentators inferred it as Holmes
and Hand did, out of the terror of the alternatives, which they perceived
as chaos or dissolution of the Union. When those dangers of chaos or
dissolution are present if there is obedience, it seems to me, the President
must have the authority to reach an independent and contrasting deci-
sion. So in the end Lincoln could issue the Emancipation Proclamation,
even if that meant freeing Dred Scott personally. But as I have empha-
sized several times, it must be quite extraordinary. We have seen these
20. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
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occasions very rarely in our history. One hopes they will be rarer still in
the future.
QUESTION Mr. Ross, if a bill was passed by both houses of Congress
and signed by the President, and thereafter, a subsequent President be-
lieved the legislation unconstitutional, would the President, to correct the
suspension of that statute, have to present a case or controversy to obtain
judicial review?
ROSS: Not necessarily. Virtually all laws have impact. They are
reaching beyond the confines of the governmental structure. There will
be other people who will be affected when we can present to the Court
their question of the constitutionality of the statutory provision. It then
raises a further question which someone alluded to earlier. I might take
a moment to address that question. Does the executive branch have an
obligation, notwithstanding its current distaste or dislike of a constitu-
tional question concerning a statutory provision, to defend it in court?
Some of you may be aware of what has become an ever increasing, and
frankly rather troubling portion of the role of my office, which is to step
into the breach, as it were, and to provide an official defense of the stat-
utes that the executive branch is required to fend for before the courts. I
say it is troubling, but actually, as you might imagine, it is probably the
most joyful and most stimulating part of my job. But from the stand-
point of governmental structure it is somewhat troubling.
I will give you one current example. There is a fifty-odd year old stat-
ute on the books covering the sale and advertising of beer and malt bever-
ages. The statute prohibits the use and utilization of alcoholic content on
either the label or in the advertising of such alcoholic products. The
constitutionality of that statutory provision and its enforcement was
challenged by a large beer manufacturer whose litigation is now pending.
When the case was presented to the court, a determination was made by
the Department of Justice that there was no reasonable, constitutional
defense that could be offered on behalf of the statutory provision. The
Department walked into court and conceded to the unconstitutionality of
the statute. That is troubling, especially in light of the fact that several
months later the Solicitor General, when it came to the court of appeals,
said, "Well gee, it's my role to review the position of the United States in
health litigation, and frankly I feel that not only are there reasonable
defenses of constitutionality that can be offered, but that they are fairly
easy to make." The United States, the executive branch, has now
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stepped back into the case and has joined us in the defense of the consti-
tutionality of the statute. The notion that a lawyer will be sitting in the
Department of Justice and say, "Well gee, this statute works, defend it or
not," is troubling and I think it is part of the question of the role of the
executive branch in determining the constitutionality of statutes. People
should consider it.
